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The public-sector Vocational Rehabilitation (VR) program is a $3 billion federal-
state partnership designed to provide employment-related assistance to persons
with disabilities. While thought to play an important role in helping persons
with disabilities to engage in gainful employment (Loprest, 2007), very little
is known about the long term-e¢ cacy of VR in the United States. With one
very recent exception (Cimera, 2010), the last published evaluation of the U.S.
public-sector VR program is from over 20 years ago (Dean and Dolan,1991).1
Although certainly informative, the earlier studies have a number of method-
ological shortcomings and have only limited relevance to the current VR system
which serves a clientele with a much wider range of impairments. Originally
established in 1919 to provide restorative services to persons with primarily
physical disabilities, the program￿ s emphasis has shifted in recent decades to
serve persons with cognitive impairments or mental illness. While comprising
an ever-larger share of the VR clientele, the latter group has turned out to be
particularly hard to serve. As the Government Accountability O¢ ce (2005)
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1Also see Conley (1969); Bellante, (1972); Worrall (1978); Berkowitz (1988). Several more
recent studies evaluate the European active labor market programs for persons with disabilities
(e.g., Raum and Torp, 2001; Bratberg, Grasdal, and Risa, 2002; Frolich, Heshmati, and
Lechner, 2004; and Aakvik, Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005 ).
1notes, persons classi￿ed with mental or psycho-social impairments make up al-
most one-third of VR program exiters nationwide in 2003 but, at 30%, had the
lowest employment rate outcome of all groups served. Consequently, an increas-
ing share of VR expenditure, along with research and practice in the VR and
mental health ￿elds, has been concentrated on increasing the employability of
persons with psychiatric disabilities.2
In this paper, we study the impact of the VR program using a unique panel
data source on all persons who applied for services in the state of Virginia in
State Fiscal Year 2000. We focus our attention on VR clients diagnosed with
mental illnesses, an increasingly important part of the VR caseload. Kessler et
al. (2001) estimates that more than 25% of U.S. adults had a mental illness in
the previous year, with 7% having a major depressive disorder and 18% having
anxiety disorders. The prevalence of mental illness among adults in the United
States imposes severe employment consequences with unemployment rates for
persons with severe mental illness estimated to be as high as 95% (Mueser,
Salyers, and Mueser, 2001).
In addition to updating the existing evaluations of VR services in the United
States, we make a number of notable contributions to the empirical literature.
At the most basic level, we focus on the impact of VR services on clients with
a speci￿c type of impairment, mental illness, rather than the entire caseload.
Except for Dean and Dolan (1991), the existing state-level evaluations of VR
services distinguish among clients with mental illness, cognitive impairments,
and physical impairments only by including dummy variables in regressions.
The impact of VR services, however, is thought to di⁄er by the type of limita-
tion (Dean and Dolan, 1991; Baldwin, 1999; and Marcotte, Wilxox-Gok, and
Redmond, 2000).
Importantly, our administrative data from the 2000 applicant cohort in Vir-
ginia allows us to make a number of contributions to the literature. Other
economic analyses of VR e¢ cacy (see Conley, 1969; Bellante, 1972; Worrall,
1978; Nowak, 1983) have relied almost exclusively on the Rehabilitation Service
Administration￿ s RSA-911 Case Service Report of nationwide closures from the
VR program. The problems with evaluations based on these RSA-911 data are
manifold. First, a censoring problem arises because the RSA-911 sample frame
is drawn from cohorts of cases terminated from the program during the same
year. This is a signi￿cant drawback for a program with a wide variation in
program duration that results in comparing cohorts who applied for services
2The increased emphasis on achieving competitive employment outcomes for persons with
psychiatric disorders has led to numerous studies published in the VR literature that examine
speci￿c interventions for persons with varying degrees of mental illness. See Bond, Drake,
and Becker (2001) for a review of such analyses or Cook et al. (2005); Burns et al. (2007);
or Campbell et al. (2010) for descriptions of speci￿c experiments. These investigations typi-
cally consist of small clinical trials of a speci￿c intervention of supported employment versus
the more traditional VR practice of ￿train and place.￿ Such randomized clinical studies are
typically of short duration and thus lack su¢ cient information on longer-term employment
outcomes. Ultimately, this type of analysis is not suited for evaluating the on-going VR
program, which legally is not allowed to engage in randomized control studies using federal
support.
2over di⁄erent time periods. By focusing on an applicant cohort, we avoid this
censoring problem. Second, the RSA-911 reports earnings only at two points:
1) self-reported weekly earnings at the time of referral to the VR program and
2) following three months of employment if employed. As Loprest (2007) notes,
these analyses su⁄ered from the RSA-911￿ s lack of longitudinal earnings. In
our data, we observe quarterly employment and earnings data as well as VR
service data from 1995 to 2008. Thus, using data on individual quarterly em-
ployment and earnings prior to, during, and after service receipt, we examine
both the short- and long-term e⁄ects of VR services. Finally, evaluations using
the RSA data classify clients as either receiving or not receiving substantial VR
services. In practice, however, VR agencies provide a wide range of di⁄erent
services which are likely to have very di⁄erent labor market e⁄ects. Using the
administrative data from Virginia, we examine the impact of speci￿c types of
services rather than just a single treatment indicator. In particular, following
Dean et al. (2002), we aggregate VR services into six types ￿diagnosis and
evaluation, training, education, restoration, maintenance and other ￿and allow
these six services to have di⁄erent labor market e⁄ects.
Finally, we formalize and estimate a structural model of endogenous ser-
vice provision and labor market outcomes. Except for controlling for observed
covariates, the existing literature does not address the selection problem that
arises if unobserved factors associated with VR service receipt are correlated
with latent labor market outcomes. Hotz (1992) provides a framework for the
Governmental Accountability O¢ ce that laid out several options for evaluation
of the public-sector VR program in a non-experimental setting that included
both parametric and non-parametric techniques to control for the problem of
selection bias inherent in such voluntary programs. Although several studies
of the European active labor market programs for persons with disabilities in-
corporated such methodologies (e.g., Raum and Torp, 2001; Frolich, Bratberg,
Grasdal, and Risa, 2002; Heshmati, and Lechner, 2004; and Aakvik, Heckman,
and Vytlacil, 2005), evaluations of VR programs in the U.S. have not kept up
with the signi￿cant advances made during the past two decades in evaluations of
manpower training programs (see, for example, Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).3
We address the selection problem using instrumental variables that are assumed
to impact service receipt but not the latent labor market outcomes, pre-program
labor market outcomes that control for di⁄erences between those who will and
will not receive services, and a formal structural model of the selection process.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the economic model used
throughout the paper. We construct a multivariate discrete choice model for
service provision choices. We augment that with a probit-like employment equa-
3Dean and Dolan (1991) follow advances in the more general ￿eld of manpower training
evaluation at the time (see, for example, Ashenfelter, 1978; Bassi, 1984; and Heckman and
Hotz, 1989), but do not address the problem of selection on unobservables. Selection is thought
to be a central problem in addressing the impact of job training programs (Card and Sullivan,
1988; LaLonde, 1995; Friedlander et al., 1997; and Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). Aakvik,
Heckman, and Vytlacil (2005) ￿nd that that this selection problem plays an important role
in the evaluation of a Norwegian VR training program.
3tion and an earnings equation. We allow for correlation of errors among all of
the equations. Next, we describe the three sources of data used in our analysis
in Section 3 and the econometric methodology used to estimate the model from
Section 2 in Section 4. Estimation results are presented in Section 5, and a
return on investment analysis is presented in Section 6. Our results imply gen-
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it is a vector of (possibly) time-varying, exogenous explanatory vari-
ables, dik is a dummy variable equal to one i⁄ the amount of time between the
last quarter of service receipt and t is between time nodes ￿k and ￿k+1,4 and
uz
it is an error whose structure is speci￿ed below. The time periods implied by
the nodes we use are a) 2 or more quarters before service, b) 1 quarter before
service, c) 1 quarter after service to 8 quarters after service, and d) 9 or more













4In e⁄ect, we allow for level spline e⁄ects for service e⁄ects on labor market outcomes.
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We include the (ei1;ei2) to allow for two common factors a⁄ecting all dependent











. We also allow for serial cor-
relation and contemporaneous correlation in the labor market errors (￿z
it;￿w
it).
The covariance matrix implied by this error structure is presented in Appendix
8.1. See Dean et al. (2010a) for a similar structure applied to people with
cognitive impairments.
3 Data
We use two main sources of data: a) the administrative records for the state ￿scal
year (SFY) 2000 applicant cohort of the Virginia Department of Rehabilitative
Services (DRS), and b) the quarterly administrative records of the Virginia
Employment Commission (VEC) from 1995 to 2008 for those people in the
DRS data. We also merge these ￿les with data from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis on county-speci￿c employment patterns. Each of these is discussed in
turn below.
3.1 DRS Sample Frame
Our starting point is the administrative records of the Virginia DRS for the
10323 individuals who applied for vocational rehabilitative (VR) services in SFY
2000 (July 1, 1999 - June 30, 2000). Our analysis focuses on 1555 DRS clients
with mental illnesses. We exclude individuals for the reasons speci￿ed in Table
1. The criterion associated with having a mental illness used for sample selection
is that the primary or secondary diagnosis listed in the administrative records
must be a mental illness in at least one quarter while the individual has an open
case; this may be the ￿rst case in 2000, or it may be a subsequent case. Not
having a mental illness is the single most important reason for exclusion from





of Total # Remaining
Applicants in SFY 2000 10323
Missing or Questionable SSN 81 0.008 10242
Died While in Program 65 0.006 10177
Missing Gender or Date of Birth 1 0.000 10176
Not in Virginia 59 0.006 10117
Not Mentally Ill 6476 0.640 3641
Missing Primary Disability 87 0.024 3554
Missing Secondary Disability 7 0.002 3547
Initial Service Spell before SFY 2000 1220 0.344 2327
Age Younger than 21 Years 701 0.301 1626
Neither Service nor Employment Record 71 0.044 1555
Number Remaining in Sample 1555 0.151
Table 1: Missing Value Analysis
need diagnoses for each case, we exclude 94 observations where primary and/or
secondary diagnosis was missing as well.5 We also excluded 71 individuals with
neither any service records nor employment records.6
We focus on the ￿base case￿de￿ned as an individual￿ s initial case in SFY
2000, recognizing that individuals can have multiple ￿service spells￿or ￿cases,￿
each of which includes an application and administrative closure. We have ad-
ministrative information between SFY 1987 and 2007 that allows us to identify
these multiple service spells and exclude observations where the individual￿ s ￿rst
service spell was prior to SFY 2000. We do this to avoid bias associated with
left censoring (e.g., Heckman and Singer, 1984a). In particular, if the subsam-
ple of people who enroll in services more than once is di⁄erent than those who
enroll only once, then those people who had service spells prior to SFY 2000
will have unobservable characteristics di⁄erent than those whose ￿rst spell is in
SFY 2000.
3.2 DRS Data for Service Provision
Upon application, an individual￿ s case is assigned to a counselor who assesses
the individual￿ s eligibility for the program. This assessment typically includes
a diagnosis of the impairment. The case may be administratively closed at this
point because the impairment is deemed insu¢ ciently severe or too severe or
5All of the occurances of missing primary and/or secondary diagnosis occur in subsequent
cases after the SFY 2000 base case.
6While it could be the case that such individuals applied to DRS and withdrew for some
reason and were also never employed, we were concerned about including such observations
because there was a reasonable chance of a problem with the merging of the DRS and VEC
data. To the degree that we excluded valid observations, we are biasing our results toward
￿nding no e⁄ect for DRS services because the excluded observations would have been recorded
as having no employment and no change in employment before and after service had we
included them.
6because the individual withdraws from further consideration for VR eligibility.
Beyond assessment and some counseling, these individuals receive few, if any,
services.
By contrast, for those accepted for service, the counselor and individual de-
velop an individualized plan for employment (IPE) which speci￿es the array of
services to be provided. Services can include, for example, restorative medical
care, vocational counseling and guidance, training (both vocational and rehabil-
itative), education, job search and placement, and/or assistive services. Some
individuals drop out before completing the program, possibly having received
little or no services beyond the development of an IPE.
Services can be provided to an individual in any combination of three ways:
a) internally by DRS personnel, b) as a ￿similar bene￿t￿purchased or provided
by another governmental agency or not-for-pro￿t organization with no charge
to DRS, and/or c) as a ￿purchased service￿through an outside vendor using
DRS funds. We have access to dates, quantities, costs, and types of purchased
services because they are recorded by DRS for accounting purposes. Purchased
service expenditures were recorded for 70% of base cases, ranging up to $48069
for a single case with a mean of $2055 and standard deviation of $3848. How-
ever, we do not observe the same information for either in-house services or
similar bene￿ts. DRS records their provision (but not timing or cost) for the
Rehabilitation Service Administration RSA-911 Case Service Report due at the
end of the federal ￿scal year for all cases closed during that year. The use of
this information is limited further by a change in federal reporting standards
during the period in which these cases were active. Many of the cases had
closed before the new standards were implemented.7
Given these data limitations, our model focuses exclusively on the receipt
of purchased services, although we do impute a value of total service costs for
cost/bene￿t analysis as discussed in Section 6. We ignore service cost in the
estimation model because of a) incomplete service costs and provision dates
and b) the standard approach for evaluating labor market training and VR
programs is to focus on binary indicators of service provision (see, for example,
Dean and Dolan, 1991; LaLonde, 1995; Friedlander, Greenberg, and Robins,
1997; Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).
There are 76 separate services provided by DRS, other state agencies, and
1252 vendors.8 Following Dean et al. (2002), we aggregate these services into the
six service types listed in Table 2. As discussed above, diagnosis & evaluation9
are provided at intake in assessing eligibility and developing an IPE and possibly
later in the form of job counseling and placement services. Training includes
7We examined the seriousness of this issue for an earlier cohort that had detailed federal
codes. For that disability type, the majority of in-house services and similar bene￿ts appear
to have been provided during the application process in the form of assessment and the
development of an individual employment plan rather than for program services (Dean et al.,
2010a). The estimated impact of diagnostic services should be quali￿ed accordingly.
8Of the 1252 vendors, 73 are employment service organizations which receive roughly half
of total purchased-service dollars, usually in the form of job coach services or supported
employment.
9We put variable names in a di⁄erent font to avoid confusion.
7Variable Initial Service Spell After Initial Service
# Observations 1555 individuals





Other Service 0.199 0.016
Table 2: Proportion Receiving DRS Purchased
Service by Type and Spell
49012 quarters
vocationally-oriented expenditures including those for on-the-job training, job
coach training, work adjustment, and supported employment. Education in-
cludes tuition and fees for a GED (graduate equivalency degree) program, a
vocational or business school, a community college, or a university. Restoration
covers a wide variety of medical expenditures including dental services, hear-
ing/speech services, eyeglasses and contact lenses, drug and alcohol treatments,
psychological services, surgical procedures, hospitalization, prosthetic devices,
and other assistive devices. Maintenance includes cash payments to facilitate
everyday living and covers such items as transportation, clothing, motor vehi-
cle and/or home modi￿cations, and services to family members. Other services
consists of payments outside of the previous categories such as for tools and
equipment.
Diagnostic and evaluation services are purchased in 49% of the base cases.
Purchased services are provided in less than a third of the cases for every other
service type. This should be quali￿ed by noting that 16% of applicants are
not accepted into the program, and another 30% drop out after acceptance
but before receiving substantive services. Of the remaining applicants, 80% are
provided a purchased service other than for diagnosis & evaluation.
The second column of Table 2 assesses the prevalence of subsequent service
spells during the period in which we estimate employment impacts of service
receipt. A total of 364 individuals (about 23% of the sample) returned after their
base case for an additional 549 service spells, or an average of 1:5 additional
cases apiece.10 For the full 1555 individual sample, the second column shows the
proportion receiving each service, disaggregated by service type, in any given
quarter after the base-case closure date. Out of the 49012 person-quarters that
we observe after closure, we observe receipt of training in 3:0% of them. In this
paper, we ignore subsequent service spells in the structural model described in
Section 2 in order to avoid having to model entry into and exit from services.
10Of these 364 individuals, 74 returned for a third service spell, 11 for a fourth, and 1 for a
￿fth.
8Combination Frequency Proportion Combination Frequency Proportion
d 232 0.18 t 670 0.20
dr 119 0.09 m 397 0.12
r 73 0.06 o 336 0.10
dt 63 0.05 d 297 0.09
t 52 0.04 r 255 0.08
tm 45 0.04 tm 194 0.06
dtm 43 0.03 dr 122 0.04
dtrmo 40 0.03 e 117 0.03
m 36 0.03 to 116 0.03
dtmo 31 0.02 dt 74 0.02
tmo 30 0.02 te 72 0.02
dtrm 29 0.02 rm 62 0.02
dtro 28 0.02 tmo 57 0.02
All others 439 0.35 All others 590 0.18
    Notes:
Subsequent Service
Quarters
1.d=diagnosis & evaluation, t=training, e=education,
r=restoration, m=maintenance, and o=other service.  Strings of
letters imply receipt of each service in the string.
2.For initial service, the unit of observation is a person, and, for
subsequent service, the unit of observation is a person-
quarter.
Initial Service Spell
Table 3: Frequency and Proportion of Most Common
Service Combinations
We leave such analysis for future work.
As is seen in Table 3, a high proportion of clients receive multiple services
during the same service spell. For example, while the most common service
combination in the initial service spell is diagnosis & evaluation with no other
service (d), the next most common is diagnosis & evaluation along with restora-
tion (dr), and diagnosis & evaluation along with training (dt) is the fourth most
common. Given the frequency with which clients receive multiple services, it is
critical for us to allow for the possibility of receipt of multiple services. Thus,
the structure of the service choice in equation (1) is multivariate discrete choice
rather than polychotomous discrete choice.
Throughout much of the analysis, we measure labor market outcomes relative
to the initial service period, de￿ned as the ￿rst quarter in which purchased
services are provided.11 While this is a simple and appealing way to de￿ne the
11We construct the initial service period as lasting one quarter and with the quarter of
service ts de￿ned in the following way: De￿ne as as the starting quarter of the initial case
and ae as the ending quarter of the initial case. Let sit = 1 i⁄ i received purchased service





t : sit = 1 if
P
as￿t￿ae sit > 0
as if
P
as￿t￿ae sit = 0
;
i.e., the quarter of service is the ￿rst quarter during the initial spell when purchased service
is received (except when no service is received). In Figure 1, the curve labeled ￿Case Open
vs Assumed Service Date￿ is the density of ￿s = ts ￿ as and the curve labeled ￿Assumed
9date of service receipt, there are two potential shortcomings of this measure:
￿rst, the initial service quarter may di⁄er from the application quarter, and
second, some clients receive services over multiple quarters. Figure 1 provides
information about the importance of these issues, with the curve labeled ￿Case
Open vs Assumed Service Date￿ revealing the density of how long it takes
(in quarters) to start receiving service after the application quarter, and the
curve labeled ￿Assumed Service Date vs Last Service Receipt￿displaying the
density of the length of service receipt.12 The ￿rst issue associated with the
di⁄erence between the application and service dates is that one might want
to treat labor market outcomes di⁄erently before and after application quarter
(e.g., the Ashenfelter dip). Instead, we focus on a one-quarter pre-service dip in
our speci￿cation of the model (see Section 2).The ￿gure shows that 44% start
receiving services in the application quarter and 83% start within 2 quarters.
Meanwhile, 3% of DRS clients receive initial services 12 or more quarters after
the application date. Thus, this issue may not matter that much given the
concentration near zero. The second issue associated with the length of spells
is that there may be a signi￿cant di⁄erence in labor market outcomes while
service is being received and after it is ￿nished. In our speci￿cation of the
model, we distinguish between outcomes 8 or fewer quarters after service and 9
or more quarters after service. Figure 1 shows that 56:1% receive services for 3
quarters or less and only 19:1% of applicants are still receiving service after 8
quarters. Thus, for the most part, one can interpret the results for 9 or more
quarters as being post-service receipt.
One alternative way to de￿ne post-service outcomes would be to use the
closing date of the service spell as the end of service. This is the case for most
of the literature (e.g., Dean and Dolan, 1991). The problem with this approach
is that counselors do not close cases necessarily when service provision ends.
Another way is to model the transition associated with the end of purchased
service receipt. We think this is an important long-term research goal but
beyond the goals of this paper. Alternatively, one could just use the end of
service receipt as the quarter de￿ning the beginning of relevant labor market
outcomes; we were somewhat concerned with endogeneity issues associated
with the length of service receipt and later labor market outcomes. While our
approach has issues associated with it as well, its simplicity makes it a good
place to start exploration of the data.
3.3 DRS Data for Explanatory Variables
Table 4 provides the sample moments for the explanatory variables coming
from the DRS data to be used in the analysis. While many of the variables
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Figure 1: Density of Di⁄erences between Relevant Service Spell Quarters
are standard for this type of analysis, some are unusual and included because
of the nature of the people being considered. Special education is a dummy
variable equal to 1 for those observations where the respondent received some
type of special education; 2:5% of the respondents received such education.
Education information is missing for 10:3% of the sample. Rather than exclude
such observations, instead we included a dummy variable for when education
information was missing.13
There are a number of indicators of physical and mental disabilities in the
DRS data. We use four dummy variables, each equal to one if the individ-
ual￿ s primary or secondary disability at intake in the base SFY 2000 case was
diagnosed as a musculoskeletal impairment, a learning disability, a mental ill-
ness, and a substance abuse problem.14 An individual￿ s counselor also assesses
the signi￿cance of the disability resulting in substantial functional limitations
and/or requiring multiple VR services over an extended period of time. Three
levels are identi￿ed: not signi￿cant (used as the base level), signi￿cant, and
most signi￿cant. We also constructed a dummy for serious mental illness (SMI)
based on detailed diagnostic codes.15
13While this is a common way to address missing explanatory variables, Abbrevaya and
Donald (2011) raises some concerns about using this approach.
14The existence of visual, hearing/speech, internal disabilities, and other miscellaneous dis-
abilities and cognitive impairments were available in the data but not common enough or not
varying enough with dependent variables to measure precise e⁄ects. So they were not used
in the analysis.
15An individual was labeled as having a serious mental illness i⁄ he/she had schizophrenia
and/or psychosis. Given the information we have, this implies that the group of individuals
with non-serious mental illness includes those with anxiety disorder, depression, personality
disorder, and generic mental illness; substance abuse is measured separately.
11Variable Mean Std Dev Variable Mean Std Dev
Male 0.404 0.491 Type
White 0.710 0.454 Musculoskeletal Disability 0.170 0.376
Education 10.718 4.931 Learning Disability 0.046 0.209
Special Education 0.025 0.156 Mental Illness 0.950 0.218
Education Missing 0.103 0.304 Substance Abuse Problem 0.151 0.358
Age (Quarters/100) 1.427 0.407
Married 0.178 0.383 Extent
# Dependents 0.804 1.171 Significant 0.619 0.486
Transportation Available 0.741 0.438 Most Significant 0.275 0.446
Has Driving License 0.678 0.467 SMI 0.236 0.425
Receives Govt Assistance 0.191 0.300
Table 4: Moments of Explanatory Variables
Socio-Demographic Variables Disability Variables
While some variables such as married and # dependents may be endogenous,
we follow the literature (e.g., Keith, Regier, and Rae, 1991; Ettner, Frank, and
Kessler, 1997) and include them anyway as signi￿cant indicators of inclusion
in society and responsibility. We include a dummy for receipt of government
￿nancial assistance even though it may be endogenous. However, for this pop-
ulation, one can work without losing one￿ s government assistance or having it
reduced up to relatively high earnings thresholds. Finally, we include two trans-
portation variables: transportation available and has driver￿ s license. Raphael
and Rice (2002) worries about the endogeneity of these variables and ￿nds that
controlling for endogeneity with some reasonable instruments has little e⁄ect on
the estimated e⁄ect of transportation on employment but makes its e⁄ect on
wages disappear.
To identify the impact of services on labor market outcomes, we exploit two
instrumental variables that are correlated with the treatment assignment but
not included in the labor market equations (2) and (3). These instruments
are the proportion of other clients in our cohort for the individual￿ s counselor
receiving a particular service and the proportion of other clients in our cohort
for the individual￿ s ￿eld o¢ ce receiving a particular service. These variables
are transformed as is described in the Appendix 8.2. The properties of these
instruments depend upon the distribution of client size in our sample across
counselors and ￿eld o¢ ces16 and the distribution of the proportion of clients
receiving each service. Figures 2, 3, and 4 provide some information about
these distributions. In Figure 2, we see that there is signi￿cant variation in
the size of counselor caseloads and ￿eld o¢ ce caseloads. For example, 43% of
counselors have caseloads from our cohort of 5 or less, and 7:3% have caseloads
of 20 or more. Analogously, 36:7% of ￿eld o¢ ces have caseloads from our cohort
of 10 or less, and 20:5% have caseloads of 50 or more.
Figure 3 shows the empirical distribution of proportion of clients for each
￿eld o¢ ce receiving each service. For example, for diagnosis & evaluation,
16For example, if most counselors and/or ￿eld o¢ ces had only one client, then this method-
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Figure 2: Distribution of # Cases/O¢ ce and # Cases/Counselor
10:4% provide the service to 18:2% of their clients or less, and 4:2% provide it
for all of their clients. Figure 3 shows that diagnosis & evaluation is the most
commonly provided service, followed by training, then restoration and mainte-
nance, then other services, and then education. In fact, except for restoration
and maintenance and some choices at very low levels of provision, each curve
stochastically dominates the ones behind it across o¢ ces. Figure 4 has similar
properties for counselors.
There is strong evidence of important variation in behavior across counselors
and across ￿eld o¢ ces. We reject the null hypothesis that the joint density of
services within o¢ ces does not vary across o¢ ces using a likelihood ratio test.
The test statistic is 407:44 (with 245 df and normalized value of 7:33).17 We
also can test the null hypothesis that each o¢ ce provides each service in the
same proportion, one at a time, using a likelihood ratio test. The test statistic
is 575:39 (with 294 df and a normalized value of 11:60). For counselors, the
analogous test statistics are 970:60 (with 785 df and a normalized value of 4:68)
and 3836:94 (with 942 df and a normalized value of 66:70). The fact that there
is signi￿cant variation in the provision of services across o¢ ces and counselors
make our instrument viable.
Table 5 shows that, while there is signi￿cant positive correlation across coun-
selor and o¢ ce e⁄ects, there is enough independent variation between them to
accurately estimate their e⁄ects on service provision.
17For ￿2
k random variables with large degrees of freedom k, one can normalize by subtracting
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Figure 4: Distribution of Proportions Receiving Di⁄erent Services by Counselor
Service Correlation Service Correlation
Diagnosis & Evaluation 0.592 Restoration 0.674
Training 0.455 Maintenance 0.632
Education 0.588 Other Service 0.710
Table 5: Correlation of Office and Counselor
Variables
143.4 VEC Data
One of the unique and valuable features of this analysis is that we have infor-
mation from an administrative data source about individual quarterly earnings
prior to, during, and after service receipt. Earlier economic analyses of VR
e¢ cacy (Conley, 1969; Bellante, 1972; Worrall, 1978; Nowak, 1983) relied al-
most exclusively on the RSA-911 Case Service Report of nationwide closures
from the VR program. At the time, the 911 form reported earnings only at
two points: 1) self-reported weekly earnings at the time of referral to the VR
program and 2) following two months of employment. The latter ￿gure is avail-
able only for that portion of VR cases closed ￿with an employment outcome.￿
More recent analyses, published almost entirely in the rehabilitation literature
(e.g., Cimera, 2010), utilize the same RSA-911 earnings measure, albeit now
collected after three months of employment. In contrast, this study uses data
gleaned from quarterly employment records provided by employers to the Vir-
ginia Employment Commission (VEC) for purposes of determining eligibility
for unemployment insurance bene￿ts.
The DRS provided the VEC with identi￿ers from the universe of 10323 appli-
cants for DRS services in SFY 2000. The VEC returned to DRS a longitudinal
￿le containing employment data for 9041 individuals having at least one quar-
ter of ￿covered￿employment during the 47-quarter period spanning July 1995
through March 2009, a ￿hit rate￿of 88%. The remaining 12% in this cohort
were either a) unemployed or out of the labor force for this entire interval or
b) employed in jobs that are not covered by the VEC (e.g., were self-employed
or worked out of state, for federal employers, for very small-sized ￿rms, or at
contingent-type jobs that do not provide bene￿ts).
We explored the coverage issue through an arrangement with the Social Se-
curity Administration (SSA) whereby they matched VEC earnings (aggregated
to a calendar year) to calendar-year SSA earnings for all SFY 2000 applicants.18
Table 6 summarizes these results for the 9913 individuals with an identi￿cation
match. For the two calendar years following SFY 2000 (the ￿scal year of appli-
cation), the SSA and VEC agreed on employment status for 87% of individuals.
VEC records missed employment covered by SSA for 12% of the individuals in
both 2001 and 2002. For those individuals where both SSA and VEC report
earnings, VEC earnings levels fall short of SSA levels by 5:6% in 2001 and 6:2%
in 2002.19
18This analysis was not limited to applicants with mental illness diagnoses.
19Data from the National Health Interview Survey 2004 Adult Sample (NHIS) shows that,
for the United States as a whole, people with mental illness have probabilities of working for
the federal government and being self-employed of 2:7% and 7:8%, respectively; corresponding
numbers for those without mental illness are 3:0% and 8:4%, respectively. However, because
of its proximity to Washington, DC and its large number of military facilities, Virginia has
an unusually high proportion of federal workers; using data from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (2010b), the proportion of employed individuals in Virginia working for the federal
government (including the military) in 2000 was 7:6%, while the NHIS data implies that it
was 3:3% for the United States in 2004. If we conclude that 7:8% + (7:6=3:3) ￿ 2:7% = 14:2%
of Virginians with mental illness either work for the federal government or are self-employed,
this accounts for all of the discrepancy between SSA earnings and VEC earnings in the 2nd
152001 2002
Neither SSA nor VEC show earnings 31% 35%
SSA shows earnings, VEC does not 12% 12%
VEC shows earnings, SSA does not 1% 1%
Both SSA & VEC show earnings 57% 52%
Mean SSA Earnings $9,117 $9,859
Mean SSA - VEC Difference $510 $616
Table 6: Comparison between SSA and VEC
Employment Records
Employers report aggregate earnings in a given quarter to the VEC. Re-
call that equations (2) and (3) model employment and earnings impacts in four
separate periods o⁄set from the date of ￿rst service. Because the date of ￿rst
service can fall anywhere within a quarter, that quarter is excluded from the
analysis other than for use as a period of demarcation separating pre-service
from post-service periods. Depending upon the date of ￿rst service, this align-
ment procedure results in 16 to 19 quarters of pre-service earnings periods and
28 to 31 quarters post-service quarters for individuals in this cohort.
In our analysis, we try to explain two labor market outcome variables: em-
ployment and log quarterly earnings. Employment is a binary measure of work-
ing in a particular quarter in the labor market and is modeled in equation (2).
We also measure log quarterly earnings in equation (3). While it would be
valuable to be able to decompose quarterly earnings into wage level and hours,
this is not possible in the VEC data. Table 7 provides information on sample
sizes and on the moments of employment data and earnings data disaggregated
between quarters before and after initial service provision. The sample sizes are
quite large and allow us to estimate labor market outcome e⁄ects with high pre-
cision. One can see that employment rates decline after service provision and
quarterly earnings increase (conditional on working). However, as is shown
in Section 5, these aggregate facts hide what is really happening and how it
depends on service receipt.
Figures 5 and 6 display quarterly employment rates and earnings (conditional
on employment), respectively, for SFY 2000 applicants who receive substantive
VR services and those that do not receive substantial services. We refer to
these two groups as the treated and untreated, respectively. In these ￿gures,
quarters are measured relative to application date (not the initial service date)
so that quarter 0 is the quarter of application, quarter ￿4 is one year prior to
application, and quarter 4 is one year post-application.
row of Table 6.
16Before Initial Service Quarter After Initial Service Quarter
Variable # Obs Mean Std Dev # Obs Mean Std Dev
Employment 31427 0.35 0.477 58763 0.275 0.446
Log Quarterly Earnings 11003 7.082 1.492 16145 7.519 1.398
Table 7: Moments of Employment and Earnings Variables
Figure 5: Employment Rates
Figure 6: Average Quarterly Earnings for the Employed
17Perhaps the most striking ￿nding is seen in Figure 5 which shows that, prior
to the application quarter, the employment rates of the treated and untreated
are nearly identical, with a modest Ashenfelter dip in the pre-application quar-
ter, but, just after the application quarter, the treated experience a pronounced
increase in employment rates. For example, one year prior to the application
quarter, the employment rates are 0:42 for both the untreated and treated,
while, one year after the application, the analogous employment rates are 0:35
for the untreated and 0:46 for the treated. About one year after the application,
the employment rates for both the treated and untreated start to decline, but a
gap continues between the two groups. After nine years, the employment rates
of around 0:20 are notably less than the rates in SFY 2000.
While there is notable association between DRS services receipt and em-
ployment, there is no such relationship with earnings. Figure 6 shows that
quarterly earnings among the employed are almost identical for the treated and
the untreated throughout. Thus, the data reveal that VR treatment services
are associated with a sharp, substantial, and sustained increase in employment
but no discernible change in quarterly earnings among the employed.
Figures 5 and 6 also shed some light on the appropriate assumption about
the length of the Ashenfelter dip. Depending on the program being evaluated,
the pre-program dip in employment and earnings has been generally found to
start between one quarter and one year prior to participation in the program
(Heckman et al., 1999; Mueser et al., 2007). For our sample, Figures 5 and
6 reveal a dip in earnings in the ￿rst quarter prior to the initial service re-
ceipt. Thus, we account for the Ashenfelter dip using a one quarter pre-service
indicator in employment and earnings equations.
Table 8 provides some information on the frequency of transitions, starting
in the application period, in the merged DRS/VEC data.20 For example, we
observe 551 client-quarters where clients moved from receiving services in their
initial service spell to becoming employed in the next quarter.21 As one would
expect, the diagonal elements of the transition matrix are dominant, implying
that service spells, employment spells, and non-employment spells are likely to
last more than one quarter. However, we also observe much movement in the
sample between service receipt and the labor market and between employment
and non-employment. In particular, the probability of transitioning from em-
ployment to non-employment is about 13% (= 2370=(15222 + 253 + 217), and
the probability of going from non-employment to employment is 5%. Similar
patterns of state dependence are found in the general population, but VR clients
have a much weaker attachment to employment; there is a much higher probably
of exiting employment and a much smaller probability of transitioning out of
non-employment to employment. Shimer (2007), for example, reports employ-
ment exit probabilities that average about 3:5% and job ￿nding probabilities of
20For the purposes of analyzing transitions in this section, a service spell ends when there
is a period with no receipt of any services. For the remainder of the paper, only the ￿rst
service spell is used, and it ends in one quarter.
21We cannot distinguish between unemployment and ￿not-in-the-labor-force.￿Thus, we call








Initial Service 1841 551 709 0
Employed 217 15222 2370 253
Not Employed 375 1954 36978 390
Subsequent Service 0 303 340 874
Table 8: Transition Matrices in Frequencies
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Subsequent Service -> Not
Employed
Figure 7: Hazard Rates from Service Receipt
about 45% (also, see Gangl, 2003; Hall, 2005; and Farber, 2003).
The transition matrix also shows the frequency of recidivism back to DRS
for more services. Among employed people, the return rate is 1:4% (= 253=
(15222 + 2370 + 253)), and, among non-employed people, it is 1:0% (= 390=
(1954 + 36978 + 390)). For this paper, we do not model the 1% of transitions
from the labor market to subsequent service spells.
One of the implications of Table 8 is the inertia associated with VR service
receipt, employment, and non-employment spells. Figures 7 and 8 provide
information on hazard rates across the transitions associated with Table 8. The
reported empirical hazards out of service receipt in Figure 7 show that, while
many clients leave service to start a job, a signi￿cant number leave without a
job. For the ￿rst two years of service receipt, initial service spells and subsequent
service spells have similar hazard rates. However, after two years, success into
jobs is better for people in their initial service spell.
Figure 8 shows hazard rates out of employment and out of non-employment.
Here, as in Table 8, we see that transitions between employment and unemploy-
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Quarter
Employed -> Not Employed
Employed -> Service
Not Employed -> Employed
Not Employed -> Service
Figure 8: Hazard Rates from Labor Market States
ment are much higher than into service provision. Moreover, the probability of
leaving employment to unemployment (or vice versa) is higher in the ￿rst few
quarters suggesting relatively frequent transitions between labor market states.
After a few quarters, however, the probability of exiting a particular labor mar-
ket state sharply drops, and the survival function becomes nearly ￿ at. Thus,
the transition probabilities are highly sensitive to the length of time in a par-
ticular state. This pattern of negative duration dependence is consistent with
other work on larger populations in the labor economics literature (e.g., Mof-
￿tt, 1985; Van Den Berg and Van Ours, 1996; Machin and Manning, 1999; and
Bover, Arellano, and Bentolila, 2002). Dean et al. (2010a) also ￿nd similar tran-
sition patterns among a sample of DRS clients with cognitive impairments.22
Declining duration dependence may occur for two reasons. First, as an individ-
ual gains experience in a particular job he gains skills that are speci￿c to that
job, making him more valuable at that job than others and reducing turnover.
Second, the workers who leave a job early are, on average, not good ￿ts for that
job, leaving the remaining workers as better ￿ts on average. In our model,
described in Section 2, we do not allow for inertia as is seen to exist in Figures
7 and 8. While modelling such inertia using a ￿ exible hazard rate speci￿cation
(e.g., Heckman and Singer, 1984b; and Meyer, 1990) would be useful, it is not
that important for our goal in estimating rates of return. So we leave it for
future research.
3.5 BEA Data
Labor market outcomes may be in￿ uenced by local labor market conditions.
Though there are no measures of local labor market conditions in either the
22Butler, Johnson, and Baldwin (1995) state that evaluations of worker injuries that rely
on the single episode model will overstate the success of interventions, such as medical care or
rehabilitative services, by treating the ￿rst return to work as a permanent, stable outcome.
20Geography # Obs Mean Std Dev
County 91072 -0.505 0.230
MSA/RSA 91072 -0.500 0.229
Table 9: Moments for Local Labor
Market log Employment Rate
Variables
DRS data or the VEC data, the DRS data contain geographic identi￿ers so
that we can match each DRS client with their county of residence. The Bu-
reau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides information on population size and
number of people employed, disaggregated by age and county (BEA, 2010a).
We construct measures of log employment rates using two units of geography:
county and MSA/RSA level. Details are included in Appendix 8.3. Moments
are provided in Table 9. The correlation between the two measures is 0.99;













































We estimate the parameters of the model using maximum simulated likelihood
(MSL). The likelihood contribution for observation i is
Li =
Z
Li (ui)dG(ui j ￿) (5)
where



































































































and G(ui j ￿) is the joint normal density with covariance matrix ￿ described
in equation (12). While, in general, it is di¢ cult to evaluate the multivari-
ate integral in equation (5), it is straightforward to simulate the integral using
well-known methods described in Stern (1997). The functional form of the





i) in equation (6), follows from the assumption in equation (1) that the
idiosyncratic errors are iid logit. The functional form of the conditional like-
lihood contribution for labor market outcomes, Lzw
it (uz
it;uw
it) in equations (7),
(8), and (9), follow from the normality assumption for (￿z
it;￿w
it) and the bivariate










In theory, the parameter estimates are consistent only as the number of inde-
pendent draws used to simulate the likelihood contributions goes o⁄ to in￿nity.
However, B￿rsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1992) shows that MSL estimates per-
form well for small and moderate numbers of draws as long as good simulation
methods are used,23 and Geweke (1992) shows that the simulation error occur-
ring in simulation-based estimators is of order (1=n) when antithetic acceleration
is used.
4.2 Identi￿cation
There are two relevant notions of identi￿cation in this model. First, there
is the general question of identi￿cation of model parameters in any nonlinear
model. Second, service receipt and labor market outcome variables are likely
to be endogenous. With respect to the ￿rst issue, covariation in the data
between dependent variables and explanatory variables identi￿es many of the
model parameters. For example, covariation between male and participation
in training identi￿es the ￿j coe¢ cient in equation (1) associated with the male
for j = training. Similarly, the covariation between white and employment
23We simulate all errors except for ￿ and " with antithetic acceleration (Geweke, 1992) and
then compute likelihood contributions condition on the simulated errors. This is similar to
simulation methods described in Stern (1992) and McFadden and Train (2000).
22status identi￿es the ￿ coe¢ cient in equation (2) associated with white, and the
covariation between white and log quarterly earnings identi￿es the ￿ coe¢ cient
in equation (3) associated with white. Second moment parameters such as ￿2
￿
and ￿￿ in equation (4) are identi￿ed by corresponding second sample moments.
Two approaches are used to address the second identi￿cation problem. First,
as in a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence design, we control for pre-treatment labor market
di⁄erences between those who do and do not receive services. If the di⁄erences
in unobserved factors that confound inference in equations (2) and (3), uit, are
￿xed over time, then controls for the observed pre-treatment labor market dif-
ferences address the endogenous selection problem (see Meyer, 1995; Heckman,
LaLonde, and Smith, 1999, Section 4). Second, we include two instruments
in equation (1) that are excluded from equations (2) and (3). As described in
Sections 3.3 and 8.2, our choice of instruments for service j is the propensity of
an individual￿ s counselor to assign other clients to service j and the propensity
of an individual￿ s ￿eld o¢ ce to assign other clients to service j. Doyle (2007),
Arrighi et al. (2010), Dean et al. (2010a, 2010b), and Clapp et al. (2010)
use a similar instrument. In order for the instruments to be valid, it must be
the case that a) they are correlated with service receipt, b) they do not belong
directly in equations (2) and (3), and c) they are exogenous. While (a) is il-
lustrated in Section 3.3 and (b) seems like a very reasonable assumption, (c)
may be violated. For example, if there is signi￿cant unobserved variation in the
availability of jobs where training is productive and counselors and ￿eld o¢ ces
know that, such variation might a⁄ect average behavior of counselors and ￿eld
o¢ ces and might also a⁄ect labor market outcomes. To some degree, we con-
trol for such variation by including measures of local labor market conditions
directly in equations (2) and (3).24 Also, there may be signi￿cant unobserved
variation in the ability of counselors to match clients with jobs, thus a⁄ecting
both his/her decisions about what type service to o⁄er clients and later success
in the labor market. We assume that these types of e⁄ects are not important
in our analysis. Importantly, our approach for addressing the endogenous se-
lection of services represents a substantial advance over the existing literature
where the past research (often using RSA-911 data) generally relies on limited
controls for pre-program earnings and assumes service participation is otherwise
exogenous. Along with Aakvik, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2005) and Dean et al.
(2010a, 2010b), this is the ￿rst study to identify the impact of VR services on la-




We divide up the discussion of parameter estimates into separate components.
We begin by examining the estimated e⁄ect of services on labor market out-
24See Appendix 8.3 for details.
23comes. Table 10 presents the estimates and associated standard errors for the
e⁄ect of services on employment, and Table 11 presents the analogous results for
log quarterly earnings. For each labor market outcome, the e⁄ects are allowed
to vary across the six di⁄erent service types and across di⁄erent time periods
relative to the initial service quarter. Given our rich labor market data, we
are able to estimate both short-run (the ￿rst two years) and long-run (more
than two years) e⁄ects of services and account for pre-service outcomes in the
quarter prior to services as well as two or more quarters prior to the initial
service. As noted in Section 4.2, inclusion of pre-treatment periods is a way
to account for the e⁄ect of endogenous selection into services. This method of
controlling for selection, which is the central idea of the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence
design, is used extensively in the literature (e.g., Meyer, 1995; Heckman et al.,
1999). The quarter immediately prior to initial service provision is separated
out because this quarter seems likely to have a distinct impact on selection and
because of the well-documented variation in labor market behaviors just prior
to the application period ￿the Ashenfelter dip (Ashenfelter, 1978; Heckman et
al., 1999).
The ￿rst two columns of Tables 10 and 11, which display estimates for the
quarters prior to the initial service, reveal evidence that selection is endogenous.
Nearly all of the coe¢ cients associated with periods two or more quarters prior
to the initial service are substantial and statistically di⁄erent than zero, the
one exception being the coe¢ cient on education in the employment equation.
For training, the estimates reveal that those people with mental illness provided
training services have lower pre-treatment employment probabilities but some-
what higher quarterly earnings. In other cases, such as restoration, the estimates
imply selection is positively associated with pre-service labor market outcomes
￿people with mental illness with higher pre-treatment employment rates and
earnings are more likely to be assigned to these services. In contrast, mainte-
nance and other services are assigned to clients with relatively poor pre-service
labor market outcomes. In general, the results for the quarter one period prior
to services are qualitatively similar although in many cases are not statistically
di⁄erent than zero. Overall, these results suggest a complex and heterogeneous
selection process where applicants are assigned to particular services based on
underlying unobserved factors that are associated with pre-service labor market
outcomes.
The last two columns of results display the estimated short- and long-run
e⁄ects of services on labor market outcomes. These estimates should be inter-
preted relative to the coe¢ cients associated with pre-service measures in the
￿rst two columns. For example, as seen in Table 10, prior to service provision,
the e⁄ect of training on employment propensity is ￿0:264.25 In the two years
after the start of service provision, it rises to 0:295,26 and then, in the longer
25Throughout this discussion, the e⁄ect of an explanatory variable on employment propen-
sity means the partial derivative of the latent value associated with employment with respect
to the explanatory variable.
26Recall that this 2-year period is one where those receiving services are in the program to
various degrees and with varying durations.
24Variable
Diagnosis & Evaluation 0.039 ** -0.216 ** -0.260 ** -0.466 **
(0.010) (0.076) (0.016) (0.009)
Training -0.264 ** -0.100 0.295 ** 0.180 **
(0.013) (0.095) (0.020) (0.010)
Education 0.022 -0.114 -0.291 ** -0.098 **
(0.016) (0.143) (0.028) (0.013)
Restoration 0.454 ** 0.750 ** 0.525 ** 0.305 **
(0.011) (0.090) (.020) (0.010)
Maintenance -0.532 ** -0.538 ** -0.398 ** -0.510 **
(0.014) (0.108) (0.021) (0.011)
Other Services -0.140 ** -0.280 ** 0.035 -0.062 **
(0.013) (0.119) (0.023) (0.011)
    Notes:
2.Single-starred items are statistically significant at the 10% level, and double-
starred items are statistically significant at the 5% level.


















1.Standard errors are in parentheses.
run, it declines to 0:180. Relative to individuals in the sample who received
no training services, the long-term employment propensity (z￿
it in equation (2))
is 0:180 higher for those that received training. The long-term e⁄ect of train-
ing on those who were trained after accounting for selection into service, is
0:180 + 0:264 = 0:444.
The e⁄ects of each service type across the four time periods can be observed
more easily in Figure 9. Relative to employment propensities two or more
quarters prior to service provision, we observe that training and other services
increase employment propensity while diagnosis & evaluation and education de-
crease employment propensity. Restoration and maintenance seem to increase
employment propensity in the short run but either decrease or have no e⁄ect on
employment propensity in the long run.
Table 11 displays estimates for the e⁄ect of purchased service provision on
log quarterly earnings. As was true for employment propensity above, we
allow for separate e⁄ects for each service type and for the same four periods.
The same issues apply with respect to interpretation and identi￿cation except
now the e⁄ects are on wit in equation (3). The relative e⁄ects can be observed













Training Education Restoration Maintenance Other Services
DRS Purchased Service Effects on Employment Propensity
Two or More Quarters Prior to Program
Participation
Quarter Prior to Program Participation
First 2 Years After Program Participation
More than 2 Years After Program
Participation
Figure 9: DRS Purchased Service E⁄ects on Employment Propensity
evaluation, service receipt leads to higher earnings conditional on employment.27
Dean and Dolan (1991) also ￿nd evidence of positive earnings e⁄ects in their
earlier evaluation of VR services, although in some cases, especially for men,
the results are not statistically signi￿cant. After using an instrumental variable
to address the selection problem, Aakvik et al. (2005) ￿nd no evidence of
employment e⁄ects of VR services in Norway.
Most previous evaluation of VR services focus on the impact of a single
treatment indicator that is assumed to be conditionally exogenous. In this set-
ting, the basic idea is to compare the di⁄erences in mean outcomes between
treatment and control groups after conditioning on observed variables. For
example, Figures 5 and 6 above, which display the unconditional mean employ-
ment and earnings outcomes respectively, reveal little pre-program di⁄erences,
fairly substantial positive post-treatment employment associations, and almost
no relationship between treatment and earnings. The structural model esti-
mated in this paper extends this approach in several important ways: ￿rst, by
conditioning on observed covariates; second, by accounting for six di⁄erent types
of service rather than a single treatment indicator; and ￿nally, by using instru-
mental variables in a model with endogenous service provisions. The results
from the structural model estimates presented in this section suggest a much
more complex and nuanced story, with evidence of pre- and post-program labor
market di⁄erences that vary across services, estimated employment e⁄ects that
are positive for some services and negative for others, and estimated earnings
27With the exception of diagnosis & evaluation, all F-statistics testing for the joint signi￿-
cance of the short-term and long-term log quarterly earnings e⁄ects relative to the e⁄ect prior
to program participation are statistically signi￿cant with p-values less than 0:0001.
26Variable
Diagnosis & Evaluation -0.189 ** -0.512 ** -0.302 ** -0.209 **
(0.014) (0.096) (0.024) (0.012)
Training 0.035 ** 0.059 0.032 0.108 **
(0.017) (0.137) (0.029) (0.013)
Education 0.122 ** -0.016 -0.049 0.248 **
(0.021) (0.156) (0.039) (0.016)
Restoration 0.148 ** 0.057 0.279 ** 0.325 **
(0.016) (0.111) (0.028) (0.014)
Maintenance -0.570 ** -0.253 * -0.457 ** -0.372 **
(0.017) (0.139) (0.032) (0.014)
Other Services -0.131 ** -0.313 0.024 0.086 **
(0.017) (0.149) (0.031) (0.014)
    Notes:
2.Standard errors are in parentheses.
3.Single-starred items are statistically significant at the 10% level, and double-
starred items are statistically significant at the 5% level.



















1.Estimates are effects on log quarterly earnings conditional on employment.
e⁄ects that, except for diagnosis & evaluation, are consistently positive.
Figure 11 uses the employment e⁄ects from Table 10 and the log quarterly
earnings e⁄ects from Table 11 to compute the average marginal e⁄ect of each
service type on labor market outcomes. In particular, for each service j with
value de￿ned in equation (1) and each labor market outcome zit and wit de￿ned
























vijkt (yij) is the outcome measure, employment (measured in probability incre-
ments) or quarterly earnings conditional on employment (measured in $1000),
for person i at time t conditional on whether service j is received yij (with no
other service being received); =ki is the set of quarters observed in the data
for observation i before service receipt excluding the quarter preceding service
(k = 0), in the short run (k = 1) or the long run (k = 2); and Tki is the num-
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DRS Purchased Service Effects on log Quarterly Earnings
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Quarter Prior to Program Participation
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Figure 10: DRS Purchased Service E⁄ects on log Quarterly Earnings
we see that, relative to the quarters preceding service, training increases em-
ployment propensity (equation (2)) by 0:295 + 0:264 = 0:559 in the short run,
causing average short-run employment probabilities to increase by 12:9%;28 a
similar calculation implies long-run employment probabilities increase by 10:2%.
In Figure 10, we see that, relative to the quarters preceding service, training
slightly decreases quarterly earnings in the short run and increases them in the
long run.29 These are the four outcomes associated with training presented
in Figure 11.30 One can see that, with the exception of diagnosis & evalua-
tion and education, all services generally have positive labor market outcome
e⁄ects.31
The e⁄ects hardest to understand are for diagnosis & evaluation with nega-
tive outcomes in the short- and long-run for employment and mixed results for
conditional earnings. There is no reason to think that the receipt of purchased
diagnosis & evaluation services would lead directly to poor labor market out-
comes. However, purchased diagnosis & evaluation services di⁄er from other
types of service in a number of ways, some of which imply that receipt of such
28Nonlinearity in the transformation of expected latent variables into conditional probabil-
ities causes the di⁄erence between 0:559 and 0:129.
29The transformation of log wage e⁄ects into wage e⁄ects causes deviations in the results
between Table 11 and Figure 10.
30A complete set of moments and extrema associated with all parameter estimates is avail-
able at Stern (2010).
31The short-run e⁄ects may be particularly sensitive to the way we classify service receipt.
Recall that we measure labor market outcomes relative to the ￿rst quarter in which services
are provided.
One might think that education services are typically provided over many quarters causing
our short-run comparisions to re￿ect on-going service receipt rather than negative employment
e⁄ects. However, the distribution of the length of education service receipt is about the same
as the other services.
28Figure 11: DRS Purchased Service E⁄ects on Labor Market Outcomes
services acts very much like a selection e⁄ect:
1. One purpose for diagnosis & evaluation services is to determine program
eligibility. As such, every applicant receives them. However, over half the
sample received these services in-house rather than by purchase (see Table
2), and most in-house services are for diagnosis & evaluation services.
Why that might be is something we do not observe directly in the data.
2. It may be that purchased diagnosis & evaluation services are for clients
with especially di¢ cult cases implying that receipt of such services is very
much like a selection e⁄ect. It might be noted in this regard that 79%
of those receiving diagnosis & evaluation services by purchase have exams
which may involve a specialist. However, this is equivalent to stating that
diagnosis & evaluation is endogenous; it is not clear, why our counselor
and o¢ ce instruments are not controlling for such endogeneity.
3. It may also be that clients who receive purchased diagnosis & evaluation
services are more likely to be diagnosed with problems that make it di¢ cult
for them to succeed in the labor market, and the DRS counselor in￿ uences
them to move in a di⁄erent, more rewarding direction. In such cases, while
this would not look like a success in our data, in reality, it might lead to
the most productive outcome available.
4. It might be the case that the least successful counselors with respect to
diagnoses & evaluation are both the most likely to use purchased diagnosis
29& evaluation services and are the least likely to succeed in helping their
clients.
Di⁄erentiating among these and possibly other explanations is left to future
work. None of these issues apply to the other ￿ve aggregated services.
Because of the variation in e⁄ects over time and over labor market outcomes
seen in Figure 11, it is di¢ cult to infer the long-run bene￿ts of each service. Fig-
ure 12 reports the mean present value for 10 years of earnings ￿ ows (measured
in $1000) excluding service costs , a 95% con￿dence range,32 and the minimum
and maximum present value of each service.33 Except for diagnosis & evalu-
ation, all of the services have positive long-run bene￿ts. On average, training,
restoration, and other services have bene￿ts on the order of $7700, $8600, and
$8700 respectively, while education and maintenance have positive bene￿ts of
$1300 and $2600 respectively. It should be noted that, in Figure 11, education
has a negative e⁄ect on both short- and long-run employment probabilities but a
substantial long-run positive e⁄ect on quarterly earnings conditional on employ-
ment. Figure 12 shows that the long-run conditional earnings e⁄ects essentially
o⁄set the negative employment e⁄ects for present value calculations. One other
notable feature of the discounted bene￿ts calculations illustrated in Figure 12
is the high degree of variability across the caseload. The discounted bene￿ts as-
sociated with training services, for example, range from $500 to nearly $35000.
For the other service categories, there are notable fractions of the caseload that
would receive negative bene￿ts.
Table 12 provides estimates of the e⁄ects of various demographic character-
istics on the propensity to use di⁄erent services (y￿
ijt in equation (1)). For the
most part, these observed characteristics do not have statistically signi￿cant ef-
fects on service receipt. Six characteristics have statistically signi￿cant impacts
on the receipt of a single service ￿e.g., education positively impacts the receipt
of educational services (0:082) ￿and another six attributes a⁄ect the probability
of receiving two services, including the negative impact of having a mental ill-
ness on receiving diagnosis & evaluation (￿0:618) and training (￿0:950). This
last ￿nding might re￿ ect the fact that many referrals of persons with mental
illness to VR agencies come from sources such as community service boards,
where extensive diagnosis & evaluation has already been conducted. Interest-
ingly, however, there is no statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect associated with having
a serious mental illness or a signi￿cant disability. Finally, three variables ￿#
dependents, learning disability, and has driver￿ s license ￿have statistically sig-
ni￿cant impacts on receiving three service types. In the latter case, the ability
to drive decreases the likelihood of receiving maintenance (e.g., a bus ride to an
appointment) but improves the likelihood of receiving diagnosis & evaluation
and education services.34
Table 13 presents estimates of counselor and o¢ ce e⁄ects as de￿ned in Ap-
32The 95% con￿dence range provides information about the variation in bene￿ts across in-
dividuals caused by the nonlinearity of the model and variation in other explanatory variables.
33We use a quarterly discount factor of 0:95. Because the distribution of bene￿ts is highly
























Figure 12: DRS Purchased Service E⁄ects on Long-Term Discounted Bene￿ts
pendix 8.2. There are two types of coe¢ cient estimates reported in the table:
a) the counselor and o¢ ce e⁄ects and b) the missing counselor e⁄ects. The
counselor and o¢ ce e⁄ects should be interpreted as @Ey￿
ij=@ei where y￿
ij is the
latent variable associated with receipt of service j in equation (1) and ei is the
counselor or o¢ ce e⁄ect de￿ned in Appendix 8.2; note that these are restricted
to be the same across di⁄erent services. The missing counselor e⁄ects are the
e⁄ect on y￿
ij when the relevant counselor does not have enough other clients to
compute a set of counselor e⁄ects.35 These counselor and o¢ ce instrumental
variables turn out to have large and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ects on service pro-
vision across clients. One should note that, in Table 12, we are controlling for a
pretty full set of demographic characteristics. So it is unlikely that these results
re￿ ect variation in the mix of clients across counselors and/or ￿eld o¢ ces.36 On
the one hand, arbitrary variation in service provision across counselors and ￿eld
o¢ ces is good in that it allows for DRS to evaluate di⁄erent service programs
more e⁄ectively by creating exogenous variation in service provision. On the
quantiles of the empirical distribution.
34The education missing variable is statistically signi￿cantly negative across all services as
well. It turns out that almost all of the individuals with education missing were closed during
the application process. Thus, in an important sense, causation for this variable runs the
other way.
35We allow missing counselor e⁄ects to vary over services. However, we restrict missing
o¢ ce e⁄ects coe¢ cients to be zero because there are not enough cases and those that exist
are too highly correlated with missing counselor e⁄ects to estimate both with any precision.
36When assigning clients to counselors, consideration is given to client disability, counselor
load, etc. Clients have no input in their assignment to a counselor.
31Variable
Constant 0.696 1.234 * -1.218
Male -0.065 -0.317 * -0.088
White -0.016 -0.053 -0.198
Education -0.018 -0.005 0.082 **
Special Education 0.436 -0.529 0.107
Education Missing -1.051 ** -3.917 ** -2.670 **
Age/100 0.146 -0.234 -0.110
Married -0.198 -0.314 -0.060
# Dependents -0.040 -0.214 ** -0.095
Transportation Available 0.173 0.146 0.503 *
Has Driving License 0.251 * -0.266 0.690 **
Receives Govt Assistance 0.486 ** 0.758 ** 0.247
Musculoskeletal Disability 0.259 -0.478 ** 0.072
Learning Disability 0.679 ** 0.049 -0.657
Mental Illness -0.618 ** -0.950 ** -0.402
Substance Abuse 0.033 -0.389 * 0.281
Disability Significant 0.316 0.118 -0.386
Disability Most Significant 0.440 * 0.480 -0.468
SMI -0.029 0.653 0.422
Male * SMI -0.131 0.142 -0.566
White * SMI -0.126 0.185 0.444
Education * SMI 0.007 -0.064 -0.002
Age/100 * SMI -0.021 0.309 -0.424






Constant 0.658 1.666 ** 0.008
Male -0.282 * 0.041 -0.092
White -0.120 -0.326 * -0.217
Education -0.002 -0.029 0.011
Special Education 0.095 -0.847 * -0.096
Education Missing -1.304 ** -3.787 ** -2.437 **
Age/100 -0.009 -0.389 * 0.072
Married -0.304 * -0.447 * -0.295
# Dependents 0.123 * -0.014 -0.130 *
Transportation Available -0.060 -0.214 0.370 *
Has Driving License 0.114 -0.319 * 0.085
Receives Govt Assistance -0.164 0.363 0.073
Musculo/Skeletal Disability -0.143 0.130 -0.012
Learning Disability 2.134 ** -0.054 0.545 *
Mental Illness -0.370 -0.503 -0.547
Substance Abuse -0.098 0.340 * -0.207
Disability Significant 0.093 -0.007 -0.040
Disability Most Significant 0.342 0.355 0.120
SMI -1.447 -0.596 0.526
Male * SMI 0.269 -0.226 0.111
White * SMI -0.003 0.144 0.029
Education * SMI 0.033 -0.052 -0.032
Age/100 * SMI -0.188 0.943 ** -0.059
    Notes:
1.Standard errors not presented to save space but are available from the
corresponding author.
2.Single-starred items are statistically significant at the 10% level, and
double-starred items are statistically significant at the 5% level.
Table 12 (continued): Effects of Client Characteristics on





Counselor Effect 0.330 ** 0.103
Office Effect 0.777 ** 0.068
Missing Counselor Effects
Diagnosis & Evaluation -0.475 0.347
Training 0.123 0.404
Education -0.732 * 0.433
Restoration -0.555 * 0.355
Maintenance -0.308 0.414
Other Services -0.349 0.406
    Notes:
Estimate
Table 13: Counselor and Office Effects
on Service Receipt
1.Single-starred items are statistically
significant at the 10% level, and double-starred
items are statistically significant at the 5% level.
2.Other than those reported, missing counselor
and field office effects parameters were
excluded because of multicollinearity
problems.
other hand, it is not clear that it is in the best interest of the present clients to
have ￿eld o¢ ces and counselors have such strong in￿ uence on the provision of
services.
Table 14 reports the e⁄ects of the demographic, socioeconomic, and disability-
related characteristics on the two labor market outcomes of interest (z￿
it in equa-
tion (2) and wit in equation (3)). Almost all of the estimates are statistically
signi￿cant. Many of the estimates are as expected including positive e⁄ects
of being white on employment propensity (0:227) and log quarterly earnings
(0:417) as well as positive e⁄ects of education on employment propensity (0:034)
and log quarterly earnings (0:056). The two transportation variables also have
positive impacts on both labor market outcomes. The two local labor market
conditions do not perform very well; none are signi￿cant, and they have oppo-
site signs. This probably is caused by the high correlation of the two measures.
Some of the demographic and socioeconomic parameter estimates are counter-
intuitive. In particular, being male decreases employment propensity (￿0:066),
receipt of special education increases both employment propensity (0:150) and
log quarterly earnings (0:415), while being married decreases both employment
propensity (￿0:301) and log quarterly earnings (￿0:219). The positive e⁄ects
for special education may be due to the higher propensity for such people to use
long-term employment support services (LTESS).37 We are in the process of
37Sheltered employment involves working, potentially at sub-minimum wages, in a seg-
regated employment setting with other persons with disabilities. Supported employment
involves competitive employment in an integrated work setting, usually with the assistance of
34collecting LTESS data to be used in subsequent research.
The diagnosis of a mental illness in the ￿base case￿ versus being initially
diagnosed with mental illness in a subsequent application for VR services has
a negative e⁄ect on employment propensity (￿0:115) while increasing log quar-
terly earnings (0:437). Meanwhile, the disability severity-related variables have
the expected signs, with negative e⁄ects of signi￿cant and most signi￿cant dis-
abilities (relative to mild) on both labor market outcomes. Unlike its impact
on service provision as seen in Table 12, the SMI estimates are explaining a sig-
ni￿cant amount of variation in labor market outcomes. SMI, by itself, reduces
employment (￿:275) but increases log quarterly earnings (0:390). For males and
whites, there are added interaction e⁄ects, all adversely a⁄ecting labor market
outcomes. Education and age interacted with SMI also have small but sta-
tistically signi￿cant e⁄ects on outcomes. Baldwin (2005) estimates the e⁄ect
of mood disorder, anxiety disorder, and adjustment disorder on employment
probabilities and ￿nds an average reduction in employment probability on the
order of 0:3 (see McKeithen and Stern, 2007, for calculations). Our estimates
imply smaller e⁄ects, at least for signi￿cant mental health problems similar to
those considered by Baldwin. A big part of the reason for this is probably that
our sample consists only of people who have been identi￿ed as having a mental
health problem while Baldwin (2005) uses the SIPP sample.
Our model has a rich error covariance structure, as seen in equation (4).
This allows for the possibility that unobservables associated with service provi-
sion are correlated with unobservables associated with labor market outcomes.
The factor loadings for Factor 1 in Table 15 demonstrate positive correlations
between the errors associated with the provision of almost all service types
and the error associated with employment propensity. However, the correla-
tion between the errors for employment propensity and log quarterly earnings
is negative (0:898 and ￿0:094). This suggests that there is some unobserved
personal characteristic, maybe desire to work, that increases service provision
probabilities and employment probabilities but decreases reservation wages, thus
decreasing earnings.
By contrast, the factor loadings for Factor 2 imply small, statistically in-
signi￿cant correlations between errors associated with service provision and the
errors associated with labor market outcomes but positive and signi￿cant corre-
lations between the errors associated with employment propensity (0:426) and
log quarterly earnings (0:255). This suggests another unobserved characteristic,
perhaps ability, increasing employment propensity and log quarterly earnings
but having no real impact on service receipt.
The estimates of the other elements of the error structure are reported in
Table 16. The serial correlation estimate ￿￿ is very large due to the high
degree of inertia associated with labor market spells seen in Figure 8. The
correlation between the two di⁄erent labor market outcome errors ￿￿ is also
large; the estimate of ￿￿ and the Factor 2 factor loadings for the two labor
a job coach. See Kregel and Dean (2002) for more details. Of those not receiving special ed-
ucation, 9:8% receive LTESS, and, of those receiving special education, 28.6% receive LTESS;
It is clear that special education is an important predictor of LTESS receipt.
35Variable Std Err Std Err
Constant 0.098 ** 0.031 5.244 ** 0.035
Male -0.066 ** 0.008 0.361 ** 0.009
White 0.227 ** 0.009 0.417 ** 0.010
Education 0.034 ** 0.001 0.056 ** 0.001
Special Education 0.150 ** 0.030 0.415 ** 0.036
Education Missing 0.273 ** 0.017 0.505 ** 0.023
Age/100 -0.375 ** 0.009 0.240 ** 0.011
Married -0.301 ** 0.010 -0.219 ** 0.010
# Dependents 0.047 ** 0.003 0.096 ** 0.003
Transportation Available 0.088 ** 0.009 0.089 ** 0.011
Has Driving License 0.333 ** 0.010 0.413 ** 0.011
Receives Govt Assistance -0.581 ** 0.012 -0.451 ** 0.012
Musculoskeletal Disability 0.057 ** 0.009 0.080 ** 0.011
Learning Disability 0.242 ** 0.016 0.347 ** 0.017
Mental Illness -0.115 ** 0.017 0.437 ** 0.018
Substance Abuse 0.335 ** 0.010 0.213 ** 0.011
Disability Significant -0.319 ** 0.012 -0.417 ** 0.013
Disability Most Significant -0.409 ** 0.013 -0.530 ** 0.014
SMI -0.275 ** 0.042 0.391 ** 0.039
Male * SMI 0.231 ** 0.019 -0.370 ** 0.019
White * SMI -0.492 ** 0.019 -0.358 ** 0.019
Education * SMI -0.023 ** 0.002 -0.043 ** 0.002
Age/100 * SMI 0.443 ** 0.022 0.031 0.021
Local Employment Rate 0.158 0.231 0.228 0.273
Metro Employment Rate -0.268 0.232 -0.258 0.273
    Note: Single-starred items are statistically significant at the 10% level, and
double-starred items are statistically significant at the 5% level.
Employment Log Quarterly Earnings
Table 14: Labor Market Effects
Estimate Estimate
Variable Std Err Std Err
Diagnosis & Evaluation 0.159 ** 0.067 0.041 0.067
Training 0.196 ** 0.080 -0.096 0.082
Education 0.292 ** 0.110 -0.236 ** 0.115
Restoration -0.013 0.078 0.019 0.079
Maintenance 0.278 ** 0.082 0.065 0.088
Other Services 0.260 ** 0.089 0.244
Employment 0.898 ** 0.005 0.426 ** 0.005
Log Quarterly Earnings -0.094 ** 0.003 0.255 ** 0.004
    Notes:
2.The identifying condition associated with the factor loadings is that
the factor loadings for the six different services are orthogonal.  We
impose this condition by computing the factor loading for factor 2 on
other services as a function of the other 11 relevant factor loadings.  The
factor loadings associated with labor market outcomes are not part of
the orthogonality condition.
Table 15: Covariance Factor Loadings
Factor 1 Factor 2
Estimate Estimate
1.Single-starred items are statistically significant at the 10% level, and
double-starred items are statistically significant at the 5% level.
36Variable Std Err Variable Std Err
ˁη 0.981 ** 0.000 ˁζ 0.825 ** 0.004
˃ζ 0.186 ** 0.001 ˃w 1.212 ** 0.002
    Notes:
Estimate
Table 16: Other Covariance Terms
1.Double-starred items are statistically significant at the 5% level.
2.Correlation terms are estimated using the transformation,
where ˂ is estimated to insure that -1<ˁ<1.  Standard deviations are
estimated using the transformation, ˃=exp{˂} where ˂ is estimated




market outcomes in Table 15 imply a high degree of correlation between the
two errors. The estimate of the log earnings error ￿w is quite large, implying
that a standard deviation in quarterly earnings due to unobserved factors is on
the order of $7024.38 It is unclear how much of this variation is due to variation
in wages and how much is due to variation in hours. Baldwin (2005) ￿nds wage
e⁄ects on the order of ￿0:2 (see McKeithen and Stern, 2007, for calculations)
but does not estimate hours e⁄ects.
5.2 Speci￿cation Tests
We use standard goodness-of-￿t tests to measure how well we are predicting
service provision probabilities. For each service, we decompose the sample into
40 cells, each of length 0:025, strati￿ed by the predicted probability of service
receipt.39 Then we construct the standard ￿2 test statistic. The results are
reported in Table 17. For each service, we do a good job of predicting service
receipt probabilities as evidenced by all of the negative normalized statistics.
For service provision probabilities, we accept the null that the model predictions
equal observed probabilities at the 5% percent signi￿cant level.
We perform the same test for employment probabilities disaggregated into
probabilities before and after service receipt.40 The test statistics are ￿2
33 =













Setting ￿ = 7:52 (from Table 7) provides the result.
39For each test, some cells are empty and therefore not used.
40Before service receipt includes the quarter before receipt, and after service receipt includes





Diagnosis & Evaluation 9.71 30.00 -2.62
Training 22.61 35.00 -1.48
Education 27.51 23.00 0.66
Restoration 29.90 37.00 -0.83
Maintenance 17.66 34.00 -1.98
Other 26.79 28.00 -0.16
    Note: Normalized statistic is (χk²-k)/(2k)
1/2~N(0,1)
where k is the degrees of freedom (DF).
Table 17: Overall χ² Goodness-of-Fit Statistics
for Service Probabilities
203:7 for employment probabilities before service receipt and ￿2
32 = 1405:7 for
employment probabilities after service receipt. Both of these are highly signi￿-
cant implying a poor ￿t. Figure 13 plots the deviations between predicted and
sample employment probabilities for the two periods. Deviations between the
45￿ line and the other two sample lines at any particular predicted probability
represent that part of employment probability that we are not predicting. The
model does a pretty good job predicting employment probabilities in the before
period up to a predicted probability of about 0:6, after which the ￿t worsens.
For example, the predicted probability of 0:8 exceeds the sample probability by
close to 0:3. For the after period, the model does a pretty good job until a
predicted probability of about 0:25 at which point the model overpredicts em-
ployment rates up until a predicted probability of about 0:82. In some regions,
the ￿ts can be o⁄by as much as 0:3. However, overall, we are basically grouping
individuals into the correct range of employment probabilities.
We consider a number of Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests to test for missing
pieces of our model ￿the interaction of demographic characteristics, the inter-
action of service type in the employment outcome equations, and the duration
of service provision by type. In each case, we report two types of statistics. Let
logLi (￿;￿) be the log likelihood contribution from equation (5) where ￿ is the
vector of parameters de￿ned above equation (5) and ￿ is the vector of parame-
ters associated with a particular hypothesis test; i.e., H0 : ￿ = 0 vs HA : ￿ 6= 0
which, in the context of the LM test, becomes H0 : @ logLi (￿;￿)=@￿ = 0 vs
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Figure 13: Predicted and Sample Employment Probabilities
where D￿1 [￿] is the inverse covariance matrix of its argument and k is the
number of elements in ￿. However, for many of the hypotheses considered,
D￿1 [￿] is not well-behaved because the score statistics are too colinear. Thus,
















￿ N (0;1) (11)
for each individual element of ￿.41
In Tables 12 and 14, we include marry and # dependents as explanatory
variables but do not allow for interactions between them and male. At least for
labor market outcomes, much of the literature (e.g., Ettner, Frank, and Kessler,
1997; Kimmel and Kniesner, 1998) suggests such an interaction. Unfortunately,
for service choices, there is not enough variation in the data with respect to
marry and # dependents conditional on male = 1 to perform a valid overall
test. To some degree, this occurs for our population because the marriage rate
is signi￿cantly lower than in the general population of adults. For labor market
outcomes, the interaction terms have statistically insigni￿cant negative e⁄ects
for both marry and # dependents with ￿2
4 = 5:76.
Next, we consider allowing for interactions among pairs of services in the la-
bor market outcome equations. It should be noted that the nonlinearity of the
41It should be noted that D￿1 [￿] in equation (10) depends on the covariance matrix of all
of the parameter estimates (￿;￿), while the denominator in equation (11) is independent of
covariances with other elements of (￿;￿).
39model implies a certain amount of interaction. However, it may not be appro-
priate to rely strictly on the model structure to deal with much more complex
interactions. In fact, none of the individual t-tests are statistically signi￿cant,
but ￿2
30 = 72:52 is statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level. This suggests that
a more parsimonious speci￿cation for interactions might be appropriate. We
consider two such speci￿cations. First, for each labor market outcome, we con-
sider the addition of a dummy variable that is equal to one i⁄ the individual
uses at least two services. Neither of the labor market e⁄ects are statistically
signi￿cant, and ￿2
2 = 4:02 is not statistically signi￿cant. Second, we distinguish
between diagnosis & evaluation versus the other ￿ve services. In particular, for
each labor market outcome, we include both the dummy in the ￿rst case, and
we add a second dummy equal to one i⁄the individual uses at least two services
excluding diagnosis & evaluation. Again, none of the results are statistically
signi￿cant. Overall, these results suggest that it is not important to allow for
service interactions.
Next, based on comments we received from counselors and program admin-
istrators, we test to see if the e⁄ects of services vary across gender or race. We
included interactions for male and white and then with each of the 6 service
types, all allowed to vary across e⁄ects before service, short-run after service,
and long-run after service. The results are reported in Table 18. Most of the
mean score statistics are statistically insigni￿cant (and therefore not reported
in Table 18). Also, no score statistics for diagnosis & evaluation, training,
or maintenance are statistically signi￿cant. For education, relative to black
women (the base group), white women have larger short-run and long-run earn-
ings e⁄ects. For other services, relative to black women, black men have larger
short-run and long-run employments e⁄ects, and white men have a smaller long-
run employment e⁄ect.42 Overall, the ￿2
108 test statistic is very large, but this
is almost totally caused by correlations of score statistics between these interac-
tion terms and the other estimated model parameters; it does not appear that
allowing for such interactions is qualitatively important.
Finally, in a ￿rst attempt to measure the potential e⁄ect of a continuous
service variable, we test to see if the length of service43 a⁄ects labor market
outcomes. None of the t-statistics are statistically signi￿cant, but, for the joint
test, ￿2
12 = 21:05 is statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level. There are two
possibly counteracting e⁄ects here: true positive value for longer service receipt
and selection e⁄ects due to clients with greater needs receiving service longer
and then not performing as well in the labor market. The same may (or may
not) be true for service expenditures. We leave this question for future work.
6 Return on Investment
The preceding analysis suggests that, except for purchased diagnosis & eval-
uation services, observed DRS services have long-run positive e⁄ects on labor
42Also, for restoration, relative to black women, white women have larger selection e⁄ects.
43Length of service is de￿ned in footnote 13 as ￿e.
40Market Outcome Male White Service Mean Score
Short-run, Employment No Yes 0.141
Long-run, Employment Yes No -0.471
Long-run, Employment Yes Yes -1.022
Before, Employment No Yes Restoration 0.078
Short-run, Employment Yes No Other Service 0.271
Long-run, Employment Yes No Other Service 0.302
Long-run, Employment Yes Yes Other Service -0.218
Short-run, Earnings No Yes Education 0.022
Long-run, Earnings No Yes Education 0.013
Short-run, Earnings No Yes Other Service -0.063
    Notes:
Table 18: Statistically Significant Score Statistics Associated
with Lagrange Multiplier Test for Gender/ Race/ Service
Interactions
1.All reported means are statistically significant at the 5% level.
2.The overall χ108² test statistic is 64680.4 which is statistically significant at
any conventional level.
market outcomes (see Figures 11 and 12). In this section, we examine the social
welfare implications of VR services by comparing the estimated bene￿ts and
costs of the program. The primary monetary bene￿ts and costs of VR services
are estimated using our model and the DRS data on the costs of purchased
services. There are, however, many factors for which we do not have direct
evidence on the associated costs and bene￿ts. For example, the costs of services
provided a) internally or b) as similar bene￿ts are not observed in the DRS data
￿le. For these items, we present more speculative evidence on the qualitative
and, when possible, quantitative impact.
We simulate the private labor market bene￿ts to DRS clients using the struc-
tural model estimates summarized in Section 5.44 In particular, we compute
the mean present discounted value of the provided services relative to receiving
no services using both a 5- and 10-year post-treatment observation period for
those individuals who received some service. The estimated mean discounted
bene￿ts are $2614 with a standard deviation of $5619 using the 5-year window
and $5728 with a standard deviation of $10975 using a 10-year window. Thus,
the mean long-run discounted bene￿ts are more than twice the mean short-run
44This simulation has a similar structure to the one used to compute marginal e⁄ects in
Section 5.1 (see Figure 12). But here we compute the present discounted value of the ac-
tual treatments provided by DRS rather than a conjectured treatment for single service, j.
Formally, we ￿rst compute the short- and long-run e⁄ect of the program for each individual:
￿i = vik (yi) ￿ vik (0)
where vik (yi) is the estimated labor market earnings under the realized services yi and vik (0)
is the estimated earnings that would be observed if no services were provided.
41bene￿ts, re￿ ecting the e⁄ect of adding an extra 5 years and the fact that the
long-run (over 2 years) labor market e⁄ects are estimated to be much larger
than the short-run e⁄ects and are assumed for the purpose of this analysis to
last throughout the 10-year window. If we exclude diagnosis & evaluation from
the analysis (for reasons already discussed), then the estimated mean discounted
bene￿ts are $7256 with a standard deviation of $6670 using the 5-year window
and $14283 with a standard deviation of $13415 using a 10-year window.
While these estimated bene￿ts are derived directly from the structural model,
there are several reasons they may not re￿ ect the true social bene￿ts of VR
services. First, some of the estimated earning bene￿ts may re￿ ect the displace-
ment of non-VR participants, particularly if VR services do not improve the
VR participant skills or the job matching process. In general, however, training
programs for low-skilled workers are not thought to cause notable labor market
displacements (see Lalonde, 1995). Second, VR services may lead to other so-
cial bene￿ts associated with the increased attachment to the labor market and
the resulting reduction in use of the social welfare system. While society does
not bene￿t from reduced transfer payments or increased tax revenues ￿taxpayer
gains exactly o⁄set VR participant losses (except for changes in deadweight loss)
￿social bene￿ts may result from reduced administrative cost associated with
welfare programs and increased VR participant utility due to reduced welfare
dependence (Lalonde, 1995). Finally, there is substantial heterogeneity in the
discounted bene￿ts across the VR participants, suggesting that there may be a
great deal of variation in the overall bene￿ts estimates (see Figure 12). Many
of the clients are estimated to have negative bene￿ts from VR services.
As noted in Section 3, DRS services are provided in any combination of three
ways: a) internally by DRS personnel, b) as a similar bene￿t (i.e., purchased
or provided by another governmental agency or not-for-pro￿t organization with
no charge to DRS), and/or c) as a purchased service through an outside vendor
using DRS funds. The DRS data report purchased services but not in-house ser-
vices or similar bene￿ts. Table 19 displays the mean costs of purchased services
for each service. On average, mean expenditures for training, at $600, account
for just over 40% of the total average cost of purchased services. Interestingly,
the average cost for training is substantially less than the mean long-term dis-
counted marginal bene￿t of $7700 (see Figure 12). Overall, the mean costs of
purchased services among all 1555 clients (30% of whom receive no purchased
services) equals $1436 with a standard deviation of $3353. These mean cost
estimates have not been discounted, and thus will be in￿ ated to the extent the
purchased services are provided over long periods.
The DRS data do not provide information on the costs of DRS-provided
services, similar bene￿ts, or of administrating the program. To estimate these
costs, we use information on DRS spending by ￿scal year as reported to the US
Social Security Administration. These reports summarize information on aggre-
gate administrative costs, DRS-provided counseling, guidance, and placement
service costs, purchased service cost, and size of the caseload for each ￿scal year.
These reports, however, do not provide information on the costs associated with









Diagnosis & Evaluation $126 $415 39%
Training $601 $1,956 29%
Education $193 $1,096 11%
Restoration $227 $771 28%
Maintenance $246 $1,320 25%
Other Services $44 $551 6%
    Notes:
1.Moments are not conditional on receipt of service.
2.Moments do not include cost of in-house services or similar
benefits.
Table 19: Moments of Expenditure Data on
Purchased Services
years, in general, non-purchased service and administrative costs account for
45% of total expenditures, re￿ ecting an average cost per client of roughly $200
per month.
While these reports do not provide information speci￿c to the di⁄erent im-
pairment groups, this auxiliary information can be used to infer the cost for our
sample of applicants with mental illnesses. Two di⁄erent approaches are used.
In the ￿rst, we anchor on the fact that purchased services account for 45% of
total VR costs. Given that purchased service costs for our sample average $1436
per client, ￿xed costs are estimated to be $1800 (￿ ($1436=0:45) ￿ $1436) per
client. In the second, we anchor on the fact that the average costs of admin-
istration and non-purchased services is $200 per client-month. Given that the
average service spell length is 6 quarters, these costs are estimated to be $3600
(= 3￿6￿200) per client. These two estimates re￿ ect our uncertainty about the
costs of non-purchased services and administration. Cases of individuals with
mental illness may di⁄er from the general population in both average purchased
service expenditures and average spell lengths. So, if cases of individuals with
mental illness have low average purchased services relative to non-purchased
service costs, the ￿rst approach would be downward-biased. If instead, such
cases have relatively low average costs associated with administration or non-
purchased services, the second approach would be upward-biased. Finally, note
that we do not compute separate estimates based on client-speci￿c information
on purchased services and spell length. We choose to use only an average ￿￿xed￿
cost because the model and estimation procedure used to infer bene￿ts does not
allow actual expenditures to a⁄ect labor market outcomes.
43Comparing these estimated costs and bene￿ts reveals that DRS services
provided to mentally ill have a substantial positive return especially in the longer
run. In total, mean bene￿ts range from $2614 for the short run to $5728 for the
long run including diagnosis & evaluation and $7256 for the short run to $14283
for the long run excluding diagnosis & evaluation, while mean costs range from
$3200 to $5000. Thus, whether there is a net positive or negative return depends
on the approach used to infer costs associated with non-purchased services and
administration and how one interprets estimates associated with diagnosis &
evaluation. However, even under the most conservative assumptions, the long-
run social bene￿t is estimated to exceed cost by 14%.
We also can compute the rate of return for each person receiving services
in our sample. The results of this exercise are reported in Figure 14. For
each sample individual receiving some service, we compare the expected ￿ ow of
bene￿ts they would get with the service package they received relative to the





where f is a combination of administrative costs and average (unobserved) in-
house service and similar bene￿ts costs, yij is an indicator for receipt of service j
by person i (as de￿ned in equation 1), and cj is the average cost associated with
service j computed as the ratio of ￿mean expenditure￿and ￿% with positive
expenditure￿in Table 19. Figure 14 shows the distribution of quarterly rates
of return for six scenarios: three with f = $1800 and three with f = $3600;
and, for each assumption about f, we consider a) a 10-year horizon excluding
diagnosis & evaluation, b) a 10-year horizon including diagnosis & evaluation,
and c) a 5-year horizon excluding diagnosis & evaluation.46 First, it is clear that
earnings ￿ ows in years 6 through 10 have a signi￿cant impact on estimated rates
of return, at least for conventional rates of return.47 Thus, it is important to use
long panels of earnings data such as ours when estimating rates of return.48 Also
it is clear that exclusion of observations receiving only diagnosis & evaluation
45An alternative is to use actual cost for each individual. The attractive feature of such an
approach is that there is signi￿cant variation in cost even conditional on the set of services
received. However, we choose to use only average costs for each service because, in the
model and estimation procedure, we do not allow actual expenditures to a⁄ect labor market
outcomes.
46Note that, when excluding diagnosis & evaluation, we a) ignore observations receiving
only diagnosis & evaluation and b) ignore all costs and bene￿ts associated with receipt of
diagnosis & evaluation.
47At very high rates of return, later years become irrelevant because of the implied heavy
discounting. For example, at a 20% quarterly rate of return, the discount factor associated
with earnings 6 years in the future is 0:013.
48Estimated rates for returns for non-VR government training programs aimed at econom-
ically disadvantaged people also tend to be sensitive to short versus long horizons, and vary
widely across programs, demographics, and studies. In some cases, these training programs
are found to have average rates of return that are negative. But, in many others, the average
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Figure 14: Distribution of Quarterly Rates of Return
has a signi￿cant impact on the distribution. See the discussion around Figure
11 on how one might interpret results for purchased diagnosis & evaluation
services. Focusing on the distribution curve associated with a 10-year horizon
and excluding diagnosis & evaluation, one sees that 6:9% of clients with mental
illness have negative rates of return if f = $1800 and 17:6% have negative
rates of return if f = $3600 (i.e., there is no positive discount rate that will
justify the cost of services relative to the ￿ ow of future bene￿ts). At the
same time, even if f = $3600, the median rate of return is quite high at 4:4%
quarterly (18:9% annually), and 10% of rates of return are above 12:5% quarterly
(60:1% annually); if f = $1800, the median rate of return is 6:8% quarterly
(30:1% annually), and 10% of rates of return are above 18:5% quarterly (97:2%
annually). Meanwhile, including diagnosis & evaluation in the analysis causes
the proportion with negative returns to increase signi￿cantly (for f = $3600, it
increases from 17:6% to 54:5%). Likewise, the proportion with negative returns
increases signi￿cantly when focusing on the distribution curves associated with a
5-year horizon. It should be noted that the variation in rates of return here are
due solely to variation in observable characteristics of individuals and variation
in the set of services they receive; it is not due to randomness inherent in labor
market experience.
Recently, there have been a number of state-level return on investment eval-
uations of VR services produced by economic consulting ￿rms or university
research bureaus (e.g., Heminway and Rohani, 1999; Uvin, Karaaslani, and
White, 2004; Hollenbeck and Huang, 2006; Kisker et al., 2008; and Wilhelm
and Robinson, 2010).49 By comparing outcomes of a ￿treated￿and ￿untreated￿
49These state level studies condition the analysis on observed covariates. In some cases (Hol-
lenbeck and Huang, 2006), researchers use statistical matching estimators based on propensity
45group, as we do in Figures 5 and 6, these studies tend to ￿nd large positive re-
turns to VR services. An evaluation of Utah￿ s VR program, for example, found
that the public bene￿ts of the program, measured in dollars, exceed the cost by
a factor of 5:64 (Wilhelm and Robinson, 2010). These reports, however, have a
number of serious shortcomings which are addressed in this paper, including a)
identi￿cation problems; b) problems caused by censored data; c) the selection
problem; and d) heterogeneity in the caseload and in the services provided. Our
analysis of the Virginia VR program addresses important limitations of these
recent studies. First, using the model described in Section 2, we formally ac-
count for the possibility that selection into the treatment is endogenous. As
noted above, a simple comparison of mean outcomes among treated and un-
treated clients may be spurious due to selection, and conditioning on observed
covariates is not likely to address this problem credibly. Our results suggest
that selection plays an important role in inferences on the e⁄ect of VR services.
Second, by focusing on clients with mental illnesses, we allow the estimated
e⁄ects of treatment to vary with the clients￿limiting conditions. In contrast,
these state-level reports do not distinguish between clients with mental illness,
cognitive impairments, and physical impairments. Arguably, the e⁄ects of the
program are heterogeneous, and restricting the impact to be constant across all
groups may lead to biased inferences. Third, unlike these earlier evaluations, we
examine the impact of speci￿c types of services rather than just a single treat-
ment indicator. We ￿nd that services do, in fact, have very di⁄erent impacts
on labor market e⁄ects. Finally, we observe labor market outcomes many years
before and after the provision of VR services. In this analysis, being able to es-
timate the long-run return is critical as it signi￿cantly di⁄ers from the short-run
return on investment.
7 Conclusions
Our results suggest a complex picture of the impact of VR services on labor
market outcomes. Pre-program labor market di⁄erences vary across the six ser-
vice types, estimated employment e⁄ects are positive for some services (e.g.,
training) and negative for others (e.g., education), and estimated earnings ef-
fects are consistently positive. When combining the employment and earnings
e⁄ects together, we ￿nd that, except for diagnosis & evaluation, all of the other
service types have positive long-run e⁄ects. On average, training, restoration,
and other services have average bene￿ts on the order of $8000, while educa-
tion and maintenance have positive average bene￿ts of about $2000. Overall,
we ￿nd that VR services have a positive average return, with mean long-run
bene￿ts of $5700 or $14000, depending upon how one interprets diagnosis &
evaluation results, and mean costs between $3200 and $5000. We also ￿nd,
scores, initially developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and incorporated in other man-
power training program evaluations (e.g., Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd,1997; Dehejia and
Wahba, 1999). All of these analyses, however, invoke a conditional independence assumption
that the outcome is independent of provision of services.
46however, much variation in the return across VR participants. Depending upon
how one estimates ￿xed costs (and excluding diagnosis & evaluation), between
6:9% (f = $1800) and 17:6% (f = $3600) of VR participants with mental ill-
ness have negative long-run rates of return, half have long-run rates of return in
excess of between 30:1% (f = $1800) and 18:9% (f = $3600) annually, and 10%
have annual long-run rates of return in excess of between 97:2% (f = $1800)
and 60:1% (f = $3600).
8 Appendix
8.1 Covariance Structure
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478.2 Counselor and Field O¢ ce E⁄ects
We use as an instrument in equation (1), a transformation of the proportion of
other clients of the same counselor provided service j, i.e., a counselor e⁄ect. We
also use a transformation of the proportion of other clients from the same o¢ ce
provided service j, i.e., an o¢ ce e⁄ect. We transform the counselor and o¢ ce
e⁄ects using an inverse normal distribution function to make it more likely that,
as the counselor and o¢ ce e⁄ects vary, their e⁄ect on service probabilities can
vary by approximately the same amount. To consider why this is attractive,
consider a counselor who almost always uses a particular service. We want to
allow for the possibility that this will imply that all of the clients of the counselor
are very likely to receive that service. Limiting the counselor e⁄ects to vary
between (0;1) makes it harder for that to occur. On the other hand, using
an inverse distribution function for a distribution with the real line as support
makes the range (￿1;1).
While such a transformation makes sense analytically, in practice, it might
cause problems for values of the untransformed e⁄ect at or near the boundaries.
We propose a ￿￿x￿that both makes sense and solves the boundary problem.
In particular, we propose replacing the untransformed e⁄ect rij with
r￿
ij = (1 ￿ !i)rij + !irj (13)
where rj is the mean value of rij across all counselors (o¢ ces), !i = ￿
￿1
i , and ￿i
is the number of clients seen by counselor i (o¢ ce i). This speci￿cation allows
the counselor e⁄ect and o¢ ce e⁄ect to be more important for those counselors
(o¢ ces) who have many observed clients. In fact, it has a certain Bayesian
￿ avor to it.
There are some respondents who either have missing counselor or o¢ ce in-
formation or who have a counselor (or o¢ ce) with no other clients. For such
cases, we can not create our e⁄ects.50 Because of such cases, we include a set of
dummies for missing counselor and/or missing o¢ ce e⁄ects. It turns out that
these dummies are very highly correlated, and most of the missing o¢ ce e⁄ects
must be excluded from the model to avoid a singular Hessian.
Tables A.1 and A.2 provide information about the moments of the trans-
formed counselor and o¢ ce e⁄ects. One can see that there is signi￿cant varia-
tion in both. There is some evidence of left-tailed skewness but no unreasonable
outliers. The lack of outliers occurs despite zeroes for some services for some
counselors and ￿eld o¢ ces because of the weighted average inherent in equation
(13).
8.3 Local Labor Market Conditions
Virginia is unique among states in that it has both counties and independent
cities. While BEA provides data for almost all counties and independent cities,
there is a small number of mostly rural counties for which BEA provides data
50In fact, when a counselor (o¢ ce) has only one other client, we treat it as missing also.
48Service Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Diagnosis & Evaluation -0.396 0.264 -1.512 0.785
Training -0.149 0.255 -1.133 0.707
Education -1.200 0.388 -2.699 -0.189
Restoration -0.719 0.463 -2.469 0.511
Maintenance -0.502 0.410 -1.754 0.419
Other Service -0.828 0.595 -2.668 0.405
    Note: # Obs = 1489.
Table A.1: Moments of Inverse Normal Transformed
Office Effects
Service Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Diagnosis & Evaluation -0.412 0.424 -2.061 1.045
Training -0.173 0.513 -1.795 1.472
Education -1.351 0.625 -2.542 0.66
Restoration -0.805 0.615 -2.298 0.735
Maintenance -0.549 0.564 -2.105 0.802
Other Service -0.883 0.697 -2.303 1.054
    Note: # Obs = 1485.











































Franklin/ Southhampton Franklin, Southhampton
Harrisonburg Rural Page, Shenandoah
Table A.3: Aggregated Regions
only after some aggregation. We create 11 aggregated regions to deal with this
problem listed in Table A.3.
We construct employment rate by dividing number of people employed by
working age population. We do this both at the county/independent city level
and at the MSA level. Signi￿cant variation in these measures exists across
time, across geography, and across the two separate measures. One should note
that there are some counties with employment rates greater than one. This
occurs because the population numbers are based on county of residence while
the employment numbers are based on county where one works. Thus, these
rates re￿ ect variation in net commuting patterns across counties.
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